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Sovereign countries usually do not refuse to honor their debt obligations. Defaulting countries will be shut out of global credit markets and raising external finance will be extremely difficult in the future. Even then, Argentina did not have much of a choice but to default on its debt repayments to international creditors in 2001. The government’s finances were so bad that it could not have made the repayments even if it wanted to, as the IMF refused to provide additional loans. At $81 billion, it was the biggest ever sovereign debt default in history.

Argentina’s hydro-electric potential is vastly under-exploited and may hold the
key to the country’s future energy security.
The first wave of development happened towards the second half of the 19th
century when increased export demand led to the establishment of immense livestock
ranches and commercial farms. Large scale migration from Europe before the Great
War ensured a steady supply of labor, essential for farm development. The country
subsequently expanded its export basket to include corn and wheat, which eclipsed
meat exports by the first quarter of the 20th century.
Large capital inflows, initially from Britain and subsequently from the U.S., facilitated
the modernization of the farm sector and industrialization in the country. In the
absence of domestic capital and credit, foreign investments financed the development
of the meat packing industry and the railway network. Meanwhile, increased urbanization
pushed up domestic consumption which became the primary driver of economic growth.
Foreign investment flows dried up after the Second World War and the Peron government,
which came to power after the War, nationalized most of the economy. These policies
remained for the next several decades and stifled long term economic growth. To
make matters worse, the second half of the 20th century was a period
of heightened political instability in Argentina. Several governments were brought
down in military coups and the uncertain environment hampered the overall development
of the country. After political stability returned in 2003, the country saw average
growth of close to 9% for the next few years. However, Argentina was one of the
worst hit in South America by the global recession in 2008 and the recovery came
slower and weaker than most of its neighbors.
Though Argentina’s economy has performed below par for the last several decades,
its strengths and potential for growth are evident. It is largely self sufficient
in food and energy. Only a small portion of its land area is under cultivation or
livestock farming, which can be expanded with supportive government policies. Argentina
relies heavily on natural gas which accounts for the bulk of domestic energy consumption.
The country has the third largest reserves of natural gas in South America, but
output has stagnated because of underinvestment. Most of Argentina’s electricity
demand is met by gas-fired thermal plants and hydroelectric plants. With only 20%
of its hydroelectric potential exploited, the country can meet much of its future
electricity demand by increasing investments in new hydroelectric plants.
Policy inconsistency and concerns about poor economic governance have long affected
investor perceptions about Argentina and have restricted capital inflows into the
country. Successive Argentinean governments have always been ready to indulge their
domestic constituencies at the cost of consistent economic policies that are crucial
to ensure long-term growth. Extended periods of political instability have also
contributed to the country’s poor record in economic management, as the government
turned more populist to gain political advantage. Efforts to build and nurture independent
economic institutions were undermined by politically expedient decisions for short-term
gains. In the most recent of such instances, the country’s central bank chief was
forced to resign for resisting the government’s decision to utilize part of the
exchange reserves for debt servicing. Unless Argentina can build investor confidence
in its economic institutions by freeing them from political pressures, it will continue
to lag its regional competitors like Brazil in the ability to attract foreign capital.
The debt default that initially helped, but hurt later
Sovereign countries usually do not refuse to honor their debt obligations. Defaulting
countries will be shut out of global credit markets and raising external finance
will be extremely difficult in the future. Even then, Argentina did not have much
of a choice but to default on its debt repayments to international creditors in
2001. The government’s finances were so bad that it could not have made the repayments
even if it wanted to, as the IMF refused to provide additional loans. At over $90
billion, it remains the biggest ever sovereign debt default in history.
Three years later, Argentina offered to pay its creditors 30 cents to a dollar on
total debt, which had increased to $103 billion including interest. More than three-fourths
of the investors accepted the offer, as they saw no other way out, though some investors
held out and challenged the settlement in U.S. and European courts. Though at a
painful cost to its creditors, the debt restructuring helped Argentina significantly.
As the total external debt declined after the default, lower demand on government
finances for debt servicing helped improve fiscal health and supported economic
growth.
However, the debt default and the recovery suits filed by the remaining creditors
made it impossible for Argentina to raise money from international financial markets.
Before the global recession, when domestic tax revenues were buoyant, this was not
a major concern for the Argentinean government. But as the economy slipped, government
finances also suffered and the fiscal deficit soared.
As the country’s debt servicing needs are set to rise in the coming years, and domestic
sources are unlikely to meet the requirements fully, Argentina may have to raise
funds from the international markets. To this end, the Argentinean government has
made a new offer to the holders of defaulted bonds. If the new proposal is accepted
by a majority of the bond holders, Argentina’s long exile from international financial
markets will end. The government’s controversial plan to set aside a part of its
foreign currency reserves for debt repayment is aimed at reassuring international
investors and encouraging them to subscribe to new bond issues.
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